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From the ashes of the First World War, the International Labor Organization (ILO) 
emerged to address the plight of industrial workers. Yet, by 1952, the ILO had embarked upon 
an ambitious multilateral enterprise aimed at peasants in the Andes Mountains, known as the 
Andean Indian Program or AIP. Confronting the paradox of the ILO‟s postwar turn toward rural 
and community development, my dissertation traces the formation of a global network of 
reformers and experts who became the principal foot soldiers of the AIP (1952-1972) and 
propelled it toward the center of postwar discussions of social and economic modernization. In 
short, my project reconstructs the networks of people, ideas, and institutions that merged to carry 
out the ILO‟s broader development agenda and examines the encounters that resulted from the 
implementation of the Andean Indian Program. 
In January of 2009, I spent time working in two of the Rockefeller Archive Center‟s 
collections: the Papers of Nelson Aldrich Rockefeller (especially Record Group 4, containing 
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Nelson Rockefeller‟s Washington, D.C. Files) and the Rockefeller Foundation Records. My 
interest stemmed not only from the importance of these collections to the broader history of 
social and economic change in Latin America, but also from what I suspected was the indirect 
influence of the Foundation and the United States Office of Inter-American Affairs or OIAA 
(headed by Nelson Rockefeller during the Second World War) on the design of the Andean 
Program. I have uncovered no evidence that either the Rockefeller Foundation or the OIAA were 
ever directly associated with the ILO‟s projects in Latin America, yet in different ways each 
contributed to the increased focus on “underdevelopment” and modernization that characterized 
the activities of international reform networks in the post-World War II era. In general, the 
RAC‟s holdings support my conclusions about how the experiences and social networks 
established in the context of fighting the Second World War informed and shaped the “war” 
against “underdevelopment” waged during the Cold War.  
My research suggests that the OIAA in particular was an important predecessor of the 
Andean Indian Program. Like the AIP, many OIAA programs reflected a similar emphasis on 
“self-help” and the application of technical “know-how.” This was particularly true of the 
Institute for Inter-American Affairs, which began as a branch of the OIAA focused on rural 
development and technical assistance projects, but which outlived the OIAA itself to become an 
early pillar of the US government‟s foreign assistance programs. Some individuals who worked 
for the OIAA went on to careers in the international civil service and/or went to work for 
projects such as the AIP. Thus, I would argue that the OIAA served as a training ground for the 
technocrats that constructed the postwar “development” programs of the ILO and other 
international organizations. Regarding the ILO‟s Andean Program in particular, perhaps the most 
important of these individuals was Enrique Sanchez de Lozada, a Bolivian diplomat who fled 
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into exile in the United States during the 1930s, where he became an outspoken proponent of the 
Roosevelt administration‟s Good Neighbor Policy and an associate of Nelson Rockefeller.  
Lozada‟s story suggests some of the ways in which World War II, and the expansion of 
international institutions to which it contributed, helped define the problem of 
“underdevelopment” and the disparate strategies adopted to address it.   
A professor of international law who taught at the University of La Paz in Bolivia‟s 
capital city and at Harvard University in the United States, when he joined the OIAA Lozada 
was already a vocal advocate of a new approach to diplomacy on the part of the United States in 
Latin America, one that would help forge “the good will of the masses” and counteract Nazi 
efforts to infiltrate the region. Born into privilege and possessing all the advantages of education 
and social connection that it implied, Lozada‟s political instincts nevertheless convinced him of 
the need for significant social and economic changes in his native Bolivia and elsewhere in Latin 
America. In order to address long-standing class, ethnic, and racial conflicts, he predicted the 
growing influence of an incipient middle class in many Latin American countries that would 
wrest control of the masses from the ruling oligarchy. Essential to the recipe of reforms he 
proscribed were (public and private) investments from the United States in sanitation and public 
works, or “the kind of practical work you do in your own country,” as he told a US audience in 
November 1940. As a means of gradually improving the level of common understanding that 
existed between the United States and its southern neighbors, he advocated an exchange program 
that prefigured the design of the US Peace Corps created in the 1960s. Both of these measures 
were seen by Lozada as ways of “crystallizing the identity of interest” between the new middle 
class and the United States. Lozada‟s ideas paralleled the rhetoric of the Roosevelt 
administration‟s Good Neighbor Policy, which he claimed “injected the human element into the 
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policies of the United States” for the first time. With the onset of World War II, Lozada attracted 
the attention of the new United States Coordinator of the Office of Inter-American Affairs 
(COIAA or CIAA, later renamed OIAA), Nelson Rockefeller. Rockefeller, in turn, appointed 
Lozada as a special advisor and speechwriter.  
The RAC‟s records demonstrate that, during the war, Lozada completed special reports 
on Pan-Americanism, rural education, and other subjects pertaining to Latin America. He also 
worked on training and literacy films contracted out by the OIAA to Walt Disney Films. His 
reports to and conversations with Nelson Rockefeller indicate that Lozada advocated what he 
called “regional internationalism,” which he suggested could be achieved “by endeavoring to 
influence, through example, other sections of the world in the ways of peaceful international 
living” and “by actively eradicating totalitarian theories within the [Western] Hemisphere itself.” 
According to Lozada, regional internationalism was part of a “dynamic conception of the world 
of tomorrow…which will be universal in scope but which will tend to solve the problems of 
everyday life.” Indeed, it was the absence of a “regional unifying policy” that led Lozada to 
advocate changes in the way the US State Department dealt with the region, ideas that found 
their way into a letter he drafted to then Secretary Cordell Hull for Nelson Rockefeller in 
September of 1944. 
Perhaps more important than his influence as an advisor and occasional speechwriter for 
Nelson Rockefeller was the impression that Lozada‟s service in the OIAA had on him 
personally. During the war, the OIAA performed a number of functions in support of the Allied 
war effort. It was primarily an organ of US government propaganda designed to combat Nazi fifth 
column activities in South America through press releases and radio broadcasts, as well as 
through more substantive technical and financial aid and development projects. Toward the end 
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of the war, the OIAA‟s focus shifted toward regional cooperation and collective security. For 
example, a special labor service feature printed by the OIAA, and available in the RAC‟s 
collections, championed the benefits of labor-management cooperation focused on raising 
production levels, which it claimed would produce a higher standard of living and full 
employment for all after the war. This perspective was hardly unique to the OIAA. Indeed, it was 
consistent with a nascent Fordist-Keynesian consensus promoted around the globe by 
economists, the actions of individual governments, and the arrangement of various international 
institutions.  
For Lozada, his wartime experience at the OIAA proved highly instructive. The RAC‟s 
archives reveal that he came to see the office as a model for how to bring less economically 
developed regions of the world into the international fold, to fight the spread of totalitarian 
ideologies and to promote global economic growth. In an August 1945 memo, for example, he 
wrote that all hope of influencing the masses and middle classes of the American republics “for 
constructive international purposes” must be abandoned “unless there is simultaneous action to 
uplift their present living conditions.” According to Lozada, the OIAA was a “small but very 
significant” precedent for “this type of policy,” whether in the form of bilateral aid programs 
operated by the US government or multilateral technical assistance projects conducted under the 
auspices of the United Nations (UN) and other international bodies.  
In the early 1950s, Lozada used the experience, skills, and contacts he acquired at the 
OIAA to gain a position with the UN that led to his work on the ILO‟s Andean Indian Program. 
With the help of several letters of introduction written by Nelson Rockefeller on his behalf, 
Lozada joined the staff of the United Nations Technical Assistance Program in 1951. The 
following year he was selected to serve on the survey mission, which examined the need for and 
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outlined the basic framework of what became the Andean Indian Program. In 1954, Lozada was 
selected as the first regional director of the AIP.  
Lozada believed that the UN and ILO had an interest in the issue of indigenous 
integration “from [a] purely technological point of view,” as well as a matter of “human 
relations.” Consistent with the ILO‟s general embrace of Fordist-Keynesian growth models, this 
meant that the success of the program would be measured by its contribution to steadily 
increasing productivity, especially improvements in agricultural yields. Increasing production 
(which could be quantified with relative ease) became a gauge of progress in the area of 
indigenous integration (which was much more difficult to translate into easily quantifiable 
terms). One example of how this pro-growth orientation affected Lozada‟s management of the 
Andean Program and his relationship with government officials was the friction generated by the 
Bolivian government‟s attempts at land reform. Although he was generally supportive of the 
regime that came to power after the 1952 Bolivian revolution, Lozada deemed its program to 
break up the old hacienda system a failure because large units of land were “completely 
pulverized by land reform without taking account of the production unit which it represented.” 
Instead, he favored land policies that first served “an economic function of national importance.” 
The goal of redistributing individual land titles was, according to Lozada, an infinitely less 
urgent priority. To this end, he attempted to stimulate interest in the AIP on the part of Nelson 
Rockefeller‟s International Basic Economy Corporation, which was already involved in several 
“development” projects of its own in Venezuela and elsewhere in the region. Letters in the 
possession of the RAC suggest that Lozada‟s overtures to IBEC officials such as Lawrence Levy 
received a polite, but lukewarm response.  
 The RAC‟s holdings have enabled me to fill in the gaps of Lozada‟s story and develop a 
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more comprehensive chronology of his attitudes and activities before and during his time as the 
Regional Director of the Andean Indian Program. Furthermore, the RAC records illustrate how 
important his relationship with Nelson Rockefeller remained years after he left the service of the 
OIAA.  
The relative significance of the Rockefeller Foundation Records for my project is more 
problematic. After the Second World War, as before, the Foundation obviously continued its 
work supporting programs and individual studies in the areas of health, sanitation, and 
agriculture around the globe. Some of these projects were located in the countries affected by the 
Andean Indian Program, i.e. Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia. The Rockefeller Foundation 
archives indicate that Bolivian universities and individual scientists such as the plant geneticist 
Dr. Martín Cárdenas, for example, received numerous grants for agricultural research from the 
Foundation during the 1950s and 1960s. Some of these same institutions sometimes leant 
personnel and expertise to the AIP. Yet, as already noted, there is no evidence that the 
Foundation was in any way actively involved with the work of the AIP.  
 Two circumstances provide some basis for understanding the lack of collaboration 
between the AIP and the Foundation, despite their many areas of overlapping interest. As a 
matter of general policy, the Rockefeller Foundation possessed a fair amount of skepticism about 
the effectiveness of international associations. In the early 1950s, the director of the 
Foundation‟s Social Science Program, Joseph Willits, confided that, “international associations 
are as a rule poor mechanism for research.” The “most productive investments,” Willits 
concluded, “are those made in the best individuals or centers.” Willits concluded that the 
Foundation “should never lose sight of the fact that [its] target is the person with insight, 
competence, drive, and integrity” [italics mine]. On the other side, the perspective of 
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international organizations and the technocratic reformers who directed their operations was 
often critical of the earlier efforts by private institutions such as the Foundation. As UNESCO 
deputy-director Malcolm Adiseshiah explained at an international conference in 1952, “previous 
efforts like those of the RF [Rockefeller Foundation] . . . seemed destined to be „piecemeal.‟” 
Projects undertaken by the UN or its specialized organizations were meant to be “first attempt[s] 
at over-all planning . . . to see the problems of each nation in their entirety.” If widespread and 
systematic, such attitudes represented a significant obstacle to cooperation between private 
foundations and non-governmental organizations such as the Rockefeller Foundation and 
international bodies such as UNESCO and the ILO. 
